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Abstract 
We explain why buyers in the housing market use an agent employed by the seller. Such agents reduce buyers' 
search costs so that more buyers search a particular house. This increases the probability of the sale of the house 
and possibly also its selling price. However, since the selling price increases, if at all, by less than the fee paid 
by the seller to the agent, both buyers and sellers are better off. We identify two characteristics that give rise 
to sellers' agents and show that markets that do not have such agents are missing at least one of these characteristics. 
Keywords: Real estate brokerage, housing search, sellers' agents 
1. Background and theory 
The objective of this article is to apply search theory and the theory of markets with im- 
perfectly informed consumers to explain the role of agents in the housing market. We con- 
centrate specifically on those real estate agents who are employed by the sellers to assist 
the buyer in searching for a house. We refer to such agents as sellers' agents.1 It is not 
at all clear why the agent who helps the buyer search for a house should be employed 
by the seller. This agent's primary role is to match a buyer with an already listed house. 
An agent employed by a buyer should easily be able to duplicate this role. Since a parallel 
institution of buyers' agents (agents employed by the buyer) has not emerged as a signifi- 
cant force, one is left to wonder why sellers' agents are so desirable that buyers' agents 
cannot replace them. 
This question becomes even more perplexing when one considers the legal implications 
of such an arrangement. By using sellers' agents, the buyer works with an agent who is 
legally responsible to the seller. Thus, the role of sellers' agents appears to be in conflict 
with the results in the principal-agent literature which suggests that a buyer should be able 
to do better by employing the agent directly, e Therefore, we hypothesize that there is some 
countervailing advantage to both buyers and sellers from working with such a contract. 
In this article, we identify one reason why sellers employ these agents and why buyers 
accept such an arrangement. 
To begin with, searching for a house is a costly activity for buyers. They must identify 
the houses for sale, and get a reasonable amount of information about the characteristics 
of neighborhoods and houses. There is a need for personal inspection of houses and, in 
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addition, there may be a need to hire professionals (appraisers, lawyers, etc.) to help in 
the process. Together, these force a buyer to incur what we will refer to as search costs. 
The presence of such costs results in only some potential buyers searching. Agents, either 
buyers' or sellers', serve to reduce the extent of these costs and thus increase the number 
of searchers. Hence, employing agents leads to higher expected profits for the seller. When 
agents are in part compensated by the seller, as with sellers' agents, buyers' search costs 
get further reduced by the amount of this compensation. This increases the number of search- 
ers and the sellers' expected profits by even more. An important point to note is that the 
increase in expected profits does not come necessarily from a higher selling price of a 
house, but from an increased probability of sale. For this reason the price of a house rises 
(if at all) by less than the cost the seller incurs to employ the agent. 3 Thus, the outcome 
can be a pareto improvement. 
For our model, we assume that there are a large number of buyers and sellers. Based 
on their preferences, their priors about the types and prices of houses in the market, and 
their search costs, buyers choose whether to search a particular house. The search results 
in their learning more about the particular house. With this information, the buyer deter- 
mines his/her reservation price for the house. Hence we will refer to search as learning 
one's reservation price. 
Buyers search whenever the expected marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs. Clearly, 
a reduction in search costs, ceteris parabus, leads to an increase in the number of search- 
ers. This supports our earlier assertion that agents, whether buyers' or sellers', increase 
the amount of search. 4 
A seller knows about the distribution of the buyers' reservation prices, though not about 
any particular buyer's reservation price (even after the buyer has searched). He/she also 
observes the number of buyers who search his/her house, and he/she takes this informa- 
tion into account when setting the selling price. Thus, the seller faces a gamble. The higher 
the selling price, the larger are the profits in the event the house sells, but the probability 
of sale is lower. As an expected profit maximizer, he/she sets the price only after taking 
into account the effect on the probability that the house will sell. For example, if he/she 
sets the price higher than all the buyers' reservation prices, then the house will not sell, 
and profits will be zero. As he/she lowers the price, the probability of selling rises, and 
so he/she trades off lost revenues for a higher probability of sale. 
Finally, we "test" our explanation by asking whether the factors that we have identified 
as important--expensive search, need for personal inspection, and the lack of less expen- 
sive alternative means for reducing the buyers' search costs - -  are present in markets with 
analogous institutions and are absent in markets without such institutions. Examples of 
analogous institutions include headhunters in the market for corporate executives, indepen- 
dent insurance agents, travel agents, and salespeople. We will argue that all these markets 
exhibit the factors we believe are important. Markets that do not have analogous institu- 
tions include those for most consumer products, such as toiletries or food, and those for 
coUectibles, such as rare coins and masterpieces. In these latter markets we believe that 
at least one of the factors identified is missing. For example, notice that for a product such 
as toothpaste, the buyer's personal inspection is necessary. However, the use of selling agents 
does not appear to be the least expensive way to reduce the buyers' search costs, while 
advertising (free samples) is. 
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The article is organized as follows. In the next section we provide an example to 
demonstrate that a seller's expected profits increase with the use of a seller's agent. 5 In 
section three we look for analogous institutions and factors in other markets. This part 
is followed by a conclusion. 
2. Buyers' and sellers' agents 
We explain our intuition through a simple example. Although we assume that many houses 
are for sale, we concentrate on one seller's problem. The seller is assumed to be risk- 
neutral, and chooses the selling price to maximize his/her expected profits from sale. For 
simplicity, we normalize the seller's reservation price for the house to be zero. We then 
look at the seller's decision (selling price) in three different environments: without agents, 
with buyers' agents, and with buyers' agents and a seller's agent. 
The information structure of our model is as follows: buyers do not learn about all the 
relevant characteristics of a house unless they personally inspect it. To keep the analysis 
simple, we assume that buyers will decide only whether to search or not, not how much. 
Their personal search will determine their actual reservation price of the house. Prior to 
search they know only the distribution of house types and the distribution of prices. They 
make their decision to search a particular house based on their priors and their search costs. 
We assume that there are three potential buyers (bl, b2, and b3) for a particular house. 
For the sake of expediency, we shall assume they are all male. The seller knows the 
characteristics of his/her house and so can compute the distribution of buyers' reservation 
prices for his house, given the buyers' search decisions. We assume that the seller's prior 
beliefs, before he sees any buyer searching, are that each buyer's reservation price for his 
house is uniformly distributed on [0,200]. We capture the buyers' search decisions as follows: 
without agents, only bl is willing to search, and if he does, his reservation price is at least 
100. Therefore, if the seller observes bl searching his house, he updates his priors about 
bl's reservation price to be uniformly distributed over [100,200]. 
With buyer's agents, search costs are reduced by $2, and this makes both bl and b2 will- 
ing to search. If bl searches, then his reservation price is at least 98, and if b2 searches, 
his reservation price is at least 99. Note that bl's lowest reservation price for the house 
falls when there is a reduction in the search costs. The presence of a seller's agent also 
reduces search costs by $2. However, in this case the seller pays a portion of the agent's 
fees, say, $1, out of his own pocket, and this reduces the up-front search costs and so also 
the minimum reservation prices. 6 This allows b3 also to start searching. Hence, all three 
buyers search if their reservation prices are at least 97, 98, and 99, respectively. 
2.1. S C E N A R I O  1: There are no agents 
When only one buyer chooses to search, the house will be sold if (1) there is search, and 
(2) if the price fixed by the seller is below the reservation price of the buyer. Recall that 
the buyer learns his reservation price after he has searched the house. We solve this prob- 
lem in two steps. First, we compute the equilibrium price that the seller will charge after 
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he sees a buyer searching his house. We then multiply this by the probability that the house 
will be searched. This gives us the expected profits of  the seller. 
Once the seller observes a search, he concludes that this buyer's minimum reservation 
price for his house is 100. Thus the probability that the buyer 's  actual reservation price 
is below some price, p, in the range of 100 to 200 is, (p-100)/100. Thus the probability 
of  sale is 1-(p-100)/100, and the seller chooses the p which solves: 
max p(1  - (p - 100)/100) (1) 
The p *  that solves this is $100. Since the probability that the potential buyer searches is 
100/200, the seller's expected profits are $50. 
2.2. SCENARIO 2: There are buyers' agents who reduce search costs "by $2 
Case 1. Only bl uses an agent. 
.If bl searches, he will indicate to the seller that his minimum reservation price for the 
house is $98. Also, since b2 does not use an agent he does not search. Thus the seller 
solves for p in the following manner: 
max p(1  - (p - 98)/102) (2) 
The p *  that solves this is still $100, and the expected profits are 100 [1 - (100 - 
98)/102](102/200) = $50. 
Case 2. Only b2 uses an agent. 
Since b2's search costs are now reduced, he may also choose to search this house. Two 
situations can arise. Either both buyers will search the house or only one of them will. 
Case 2a. Both bl and b2 (now with agent) search the house. 
Now, b2's reservation price is reduced to $99, while bl's remains at $100. The seller 
observes both buyers searching and picks a price, p. The probability that both bl and b2 
have their actual reservation prices below this p is [(p - 100)/100] [p - 99)/101]. Thus 
the probability of sale at price p is 1 less this probability. The seller chooses p to: 
max p[1  - [ (p  - 100)/100] [ (p  - 99)/101]]. (3) 
The p *  that maximizes this is $133.12. 
Case 2b. When only one buyer searches the house (note that the seller cannot distinguish 
between bl and b2), the seller sets p = 100 as in case 1. Thus the expected profits of the 
seller are as follows: 
In case 1, they are $50. 
In case 2, they are (100/200)(101/200)(133.12)[1 - {(133.12 - 100)/100} {133.12 - 99)/101}] 
+ (100/200)(99/200)100 + (100/200)(101/200)100(1 - 1/101) = $79.20. 
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The first term of the expression is the expected profit when both bl and b2 show up. 
The second term is the expected profit when only bl searches, while the third is the ex- 
pected profit when only b2 searches. 
Thus, when one of the buyers works through an agent, and it is b2 with probability a 
> 0, the total expected profits to the seller are: a(79.2019) + (1 - a)  50 > 50. Thus 
the presence of even one buyer's agent increases the expected returns of the seller. 
Case 3. Both buyers hire agents. 
Now, either both search or only one searches and the seller sets a selling price on that basis. 
Case 3a. Both buyers search. 
The minimum reservation price of bl is now 98, and that of b2 is 99. Thus the seller 
solves the following: 
max p[1 - [(p - 98)/102] [(p - 99)/101]]. (4) 
The p*  that solves this is $132.84. 
Case 3b. When only one searches, and it is bl, the seller solves forp in the following manner: 
max p(1 - (p - 98)/102). (5) 
This gives p * of $100. 
Case 3c. When only one searches, and it is b2, the seller solves the following: 
m a x p ( 1  - (p - 99)/101). (6) 
and the p*  is again $100. 
Thus the seller 's  expected profits when both buyers hire agents are: 
(102/200)(101/200)(132.84)(1 - (34.84/102)(33.84/101)) + (102/200)(99/200)(100)(100/102) 
+ (98/200)(101/200)(100)(100/101) = $79.55. Thus the seller is better off when buyers work 
through agents. 
2.3. SCENARIO 3: There are both buyers' agents and one seller's agent 
Next we introduce a seller's agent. This agent also reduces the buyers' search cost by $2. 
However, on top of that, the seller pays a fee of $1 to his agent. So, the buyer who works 
through this agent has his upfront search costs reduced by $3. This further reduces the 
minimum reservation price for which a buyer searches, that is, to $97 for bl, if he is the 
one to use this agent, to $98 for b2, if he does, and to $99 for b3, if he does. 
Below, we analyze three different cases, when bl employs a seller's agent while the others 
work with buyers' agents, or when either b2 or b3 employ the seller's agent. When either 
bl or b2 works through the seller's agent, it increases the probability that both will search 
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this house; however, it does not result in more potential buyers searching for houses. That 
happens only if b3 works through the seller's agent because only in this case is b3 willing 
to search. 
Case 1. bl uses the seller's agent and b2 uses a buyer's agent. 
When both bl and b2 search, the seller sells to bl only if he is unable to sell to b2 because 
this enables him to avoid paying the additional dollar out of  his own pocket. He solves 
for the p that solves: 
max (p - 1)[(200 - p) /103][(p - 99/101)] + p (200  - p) /101.  (7) 
The first term of the expression represents the probability that the seller will sell to bl, 
which is [(200 - p)/103][(p - 99)/101], times what he receives, that is, p - 1. The second 
term is his expected return if he sells to b2. The optimal p *  is $132.5928. 
When only one searches, and it is bl through the seller's agent, the seller's problem is: 
max (p - 1)(200 - p) /103.  (8) 
T h e p *  that solves this is $100.5. The point to note is that even though the seller is charging 
a higher price than when the buyer comes with his own agent, the price increase is less 
than the dollar fee the seller will be  paying to the agent out of his own pocket. 
When only one searches, and it is b2 with his own agent, the problem is similar to equa- 
tion (6) and the optimal p is again $100. 
The expected value to the seller when bl uses the seller's agent is: 
(103/200)(101/200)[{132.5928 - 1)(67.4072/103)(33.59/101)} + (132.5928)(67.4072/101)] 
(103/200)(99/200)(99.5)(99.5/103) + (97/200)(101/200)(100)(100/101) = $79.5188. (9) 
Case 2. b2 uses seller's agent and bl uses buyers'  agents. 
Again, b3 will not search, and the problem is very similar to case 1. Not surprisingly, 
the optimal prices for when both search and when only one searches are also very similar. 
T h e p *  when both search is $133.2557. When only bl searches with a buyer 's agent, the 
p *  is $100, and when only b2 searches through with the seller's agent, then p *  is $100.5. 
p *  is higher when both search and b2 uses the seller's agent than when bl uses the seller's 
agent because there is a difference in the minimum reservation prices of  bl and b2. The 
total expected returns to the seller in case 2 are $79.2158. 
Case 3. b3 uses the seller's agent and both bl and b2 use buyer's agents. 
Now it is possible that all three buyers search. Since the seller prefers to sell to b3 only 
when neither bl nor b2 finds his selling price acceptable, the seller solves for p in the 
following problem. 
m a x p [ 1  - (p - 99)(p - 98) / (101"102)] + 
(p - 1) [(200 - p ) ( p  - 98)(p - 99)/(101"101"102)].  (lO) 
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The expression 1 - (p - 99)(p - 98)/(101 "102) represents the probability that at least 
one of either bl or b2 will have his reservation price above p * In this case the seller gets 
all of p *  The second expression gives the probability that the seller can sell only to b3 
in which case he gets only p - 1 as he pays $1 to the agent out of his own pocket. 
Equation (10) is a cubic in p *  An approximate solution for it is $145. This represents 
the p*  the seller will set if he sees all three searching, and his expected value is (145)[1 
- (46"47)/(101"102)] + (144)[(55"46"47)/(101"101"102), which is $131.47. 
When only two search, and they are bl and b2 (both with buyers' agents), then the pro- 
blem is the same as in equation (4) with the p *  of $132.84. I f  they are bl and b3, then 
p *  is $132.9826; if they are b2 and b3,/7* is $132.92. 7 The expected value to the seller 
when only two search is approximately $117.7. 
When only one appears, then as before, if it is either bl or b2, p*  is $100, and if it is 
b3, p*  is $100.5. The expected value to the seller when only one searches is $98. Thus 
the total gains to the seller under case 3 are $100.1. 
We can also estimate the total expected gains to the seller when there is a seller's agent 
in addition to the buyers' agents. These are: 
c(79.5188) + d(79.2158) + e(100.1), (11) 
where c is the probability that bl uses the seller's agent, d the probability that b2 does, 
and e that b3 does. 
Since the expected return to the seller is $79.55, when there are buyers' agents, but no 
seller's agent, the seller prefers an environment with a seller's agent for all e for which 
equation (11) exceeds $79.55. Since this certainly occurs for e > .016, the seller is better 
off with a seller's agent whenever the probability that b3 will work through this agent is 
above 1.6 percent. Since, a priori,  there is no reason to expect that e is significantly dif- 
ferent from 33 percent, the seller would be better off with a seller's agent. 
These particular scenarios were chosen specifically to show the following: by compar- 
ing scenario 1 to scenario 2 (cases 1-3), one sees that when buyers' agents are available, 
equilibrium cannot have no agents used. With no agents, the seller's expected profits are 
50 and the price is 100. I f  bl hires an agent (scenario 2, case 1), the selling price and the 
seller's expected profits are unchanged, while search costs decrease by $2. Hence bl is 
better off. The same reasoning shows that, relative to the no-agent case, b2 is better off, too. 
Next, we computed scenario 2, case 3. This gives us a baseline case from which to evaluate 
the use of seller's agents. Scenario 2, case 3, is the outcome when all buyers have access 
to a buyer's agent. Notice that this solution (an equilibrium if seller's agents are prohibited) 
leaves the seller with expected profits of $79.55. Notice also that price is higher than $100 
if both buyers end up searching the house. If  this occurs with relatively low probability, 
the search-cost savings will outweigh this effect, and all are better off. If  the probability 
is higher, then the buyers are worse off than if buyers' agents are unavailable. However, 
just as in the standard Prisoner's Dilemma game, the equilibrium has them both choosing 
to use buyer's agents.s 
Comparing scenario 2, case 3, with scenario 3 shows that, if a seller can hire a seller's 
agent, he will do so. That is, in a market with buyers' agents, the seller employing a seller's 
agent can increase his own profits and also benefit the buyer who uses the agent. Hence, 
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seller's agents must be present in the equilibrium. We do not compute the equilibrium when 
sellers agents are available to all because that alters the whole distribution of prices in such 
a way that our simplifying assumptions are no longer valid. Since our point is to show 
that seller's agents must be used, we accomplish our goals most directly by avoiding these 
extraneous details. 
In conclusion, what we have shown is that, when agents reduce buyers' search costs, 
the sellers' expected profits go up, both because of a greater probability of sale and, on 
occasion, because they can raise their selling price. When sellers also pay a portion of 
an agent's fees (that is, hire a seller's agent), their profits go up even further. This increase 
in profits is due not to an increase in the selling price (since the increase is less than the 
seller's payment to the seller's agent) but because of a still higher probability of selling 
the house. 
3. Other similar markets 
There are basically two methods for evaluating the reasonableness of our explanation for 
the existence of sellers' agents in the housing market. The first is to analyze the factors 
that drive the result and make a judgment about their importance. The second is to take 
the explanation and see if the factors that it relies on are present in other markets with 
analogous institutions and not present in markets without these institutions. 
3.1. Analogous institutions 
Examples of analogous institutions include head-hunters in the market for corporate ex- 
ecutives, independent insurance agents in insurance markets, and travel agents who assist 
in vacation planning. Another example is salespersons who provide customers with pro- 
duct information. Such products could be consumer goods such as a stereo or intermediate 
goods like those sold by the seller's traveling sales agent. We believe that the features we 
have identified as important for our explanation are present in each of these cases. 
Each of these markets is characterized by the buyer's need to investigate the "product" 
personally, and by the fact that the search costs are sunk. In each of these markets, the 
use of the "seller's agent" appears to reduce the buyer's search costs. 
In the market for corporate executives, the need to investigate the job personally is ob- 
vious, as is the fact that the buyer's search costs are sunk. The headhunter reduces the 
executive's direct search costs by permitting the executive to avoid contacting firms that 
are not hiring and indirect search costs because of the job-seeker's general unwillingness 
to have his current employer know that he is seeking another job. 
Independent insurance agents are essentially identical to the selling agent in the real estate 
market in that they reduce the buyer's search costs by allowing him to learn the cost of 
insuring through a variety of different companies. Travel agents reduce the buyer's search 
costs by acquiring the information about the different plans as well as providing him with 
information about the different locales. Salespeople that provide information (including, 
for example, allowing the buyer to test products such as stereo equipment) reduce the costs 
of search for the buyer. 
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In each of these cases, the buyer must also "self-investigate," in the sense that the infor- 
mation desired is generally not the same for every buyer. Personal preferences concerning 
vacation spots, quality of sound, or insurance needs differ sufficiently to make com- 
municating this information by means other than personal investigation prohibitively 
expensive. 
Most markets do not have an institution analogous to selling agents. Examples range from 
many consumer goods, such as toiletries and food, to rare coins or masterpiece paintings. 
Each fails to have at least one of the features that we have identified as important for the 
presence of such an institution. For most consumer products, self-investigation helps to deter- 
mine some of the product's characteristics - -  for example, the taste of toothpaste or food. 
However, it appears that the sellers choose a less expensive means of reducing the buyer's 
search costs. That is, they provide free samples either in the mail or at the grocery store. 
Also, for many products of this sort, the search costs are quite low. (It is very unlikely that 
one will dislike the taste of a new toothpaste so much that it will remain unused. Hence the 
"search" costs are simply the loss in utility from not having the better tasting toothpaste.) 
Since these search costs are already quite low, the impact of reducing them is probably small. 
Unlike these examples, rare coins, masterpiece paintings, and other similar items, which are 
predominantly desired for investment purposes, do not appear to require self-investigation. 
Hence, this brief examination of some marketplace examples seems to support our ex- 
planation for the existence of an institution such as selling agents in real estate markets. 
When the features that we identified - -  the need for costly self-investigation and the lack 
of less expensive means for reducing the buyer's search costs - -  are present, such institu- 
tions are also present. When at least one of the features is missing, so is the institution. 
4. Summary 
In this article, we explain why buyers in the housing market use an agent employed by 
the seller. Our explanation is that selling agents, by reducing the buyer's search costs, in- 
crease the expected profits of the sellers by increasing the number of buyers who search. 
As long as the cost of providing this service is smaller than the gain, the seller has an 
incentive to employ a selling agent. We identify two important characteristics of a market 
that lead to the use of sellers' agents: (1) the description of the house can (feasibly) be 
communicated to the buyer only through self-investigation, and (2) the cost of this activity 
is nontrivial and sunk. 
We also asked whether the factors that we had identified as important were present in 
markets with analogous institutions and absent in markets without an analogous institu- 
tion, We considered a number of examples, including the head-hunters in the market for 
corporate executives, independent insurance agents, travel agents, and salespeople, and 
argued that the factors were present in each of these markets. We also considered examples 
of markets without such institutions such as markets for consumer goods and markets for 
collectibles. In each of these, at least one of the factors was not present. These considera- 
tions lead us to believe that we have identified some of the important factors that result 
in the formation of institutions like sellers' agents. 
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Notes 
1. Throughout this article, we ignore the agent who lists the house. This agent, referred to as the listing agent, 
performs a well-understood role for the seller. 
2. See, for example, Grossman and Hart (1983) and Holmstrom (1979). 
3. This is consistent with the findings of Frew and Jud (1987) and Doiron and associates (1985) that, through 
higher prices, the seller passes on to the buyer only one-third to one-half of the commission paid to the agents. 
4. We realize that both the number of searchers and the amount of search by each searcher rises when search 
costs fall. We will focus on just the increase in the number of searchers so our points can be more easily made. 
5. The general analysis is available in Bagnoli and Khanna (1988). 
6. We will show that this payment of $1 does not get translated to a selling price higher by $1 over when there 
are only buyers' agents. Thus, the assumption that more buyers search will turn out to be a natural one. 
7. Since bl and b2 are indistinguishable here, and since the probability that the bl is the buyer with the buyer's 
agent is 102/102+101 = 1/2, the optimal price is approximately $132.95. 
8. To do justice to this part, the effect of agents on the intensity of the buyers' search must be introduced. This 
will measure the benefits to buyers from better matches with houses. However, this will make the example 
intractable, and is beyond the objectives of this article. 
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